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U.S. Supreme Court Justices and Press Access 
RonNell Andersen Jones * 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Scholars and commentators have long noted the strained relationship 
between the United States Supreme Court and the media that wishes to 
report upon its work. 1 The press corps complains that the Court is 
cloistered, elitist, and unbending in its traditions of isolation from the 
public.2 Critics regularly assert that, especially when cases of major 
significance to many Americans are being argued, 3 the Court 
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I. Linda Greenhouse, Thinking About the Supreme Court After Bush v. Gore, 35 IND. L. 
REV. 435, 440 (2002) (calling the relationship "problematic at best"); Linda Greenhouse, Telling the 
Court's Story: Justice and Journalism at the Supreme Court, 105 YALE L.J. 1537, 1559 (1996) 
(describing the Court as "quite blithely oblivious to the needs of those who convey its work to the 
outside world"); Paul W. Jamieson, Lost in Translation: Civic Journalism's Applicability to 
New.1paper Coverage ol the U.S. Supreme Court, 20 COMM. & L. I, 9 (I 998) (suggesting that 
journalists "are barely tolerated acquaintances of the Court"). Even the Justices themselves have 
commented on the strained relationship with the press. See Hon. Stephen Breyer, Communication 
Media and Its Relationship with Supreme Courts, 42 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. I 083, I 085 (1998) (noting 
"significant institutional differences that inevitably create friction"). 
2. See Everette E. Dennis, Another Look at Press Coverage of the Supreme Court, 20 YILL. 
L. REV. 765, 768785) (comparing press coverage of the Supreme Court to a scenario in which the 
media would have to cover the World Series of baseball without seeing the games); Journalists on 
the Workings ol the Supreme Court (C-SPAN television broadcast Oct. 3, 2009), available at 
http://supremecourtwww.c-spanvideo.org/program/289293-l (arguing that the mystery surrounding 
the Court is the result of the Justices' "unbending appeal to tradition"); Adam Liptak, Supreme Court 
TV? Nice Idea, hut Still Not Likely, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2011, at Al8 (arguing that the Court's 
media policies "are mostly rooted in paternalism or self-interest"); Tony Mauro, Let the Cameras 
Roll: Cameras in the Courtroom and the Myth of Supreme Court Exceptionalism, 341 REYNOLDS 
CT. & MEDIA L.J. 259, 259 (2011), (arguing that the Court's "defiant stance is born of fear of 
change, nostalgia, a self-interested desire for anonymity, but most of all exceptionalism") . 
3. See Mauro, supra note 2, at 266 (noting that the Court denied a C-SPAN request to 
televise the oral arguments for Bush v. Gore); Tony Mauro, Supreme Court Asked to Allow Cameras 
for Health Care Arguments, LAW TECH. NEWS, Nov. 18, 2011 at 2, available at LEXIS 
1202532834915 ("There is a long history of unsuccessful media requests to the Supreme Court for 
television coverage of high-profile cases."). When the case challenging the constitutionality of the 
Affordable Care Act arrived at the Supreme Court, the media made a strong push to persuade the 
Court to put cameras in the courtroom for the oral arguments. Access to the Court: Televising the 
Supreme Court: Testimony before the S. Judicimy Comm. Subcomm. on Admin. Oversight and the 
Courts, 112'h Con g. (20 II) (statement of Tom Goldstein, Partner, Goldstein & Russell, PC) ("200 
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unnecessarily hampers media coverage and fails to take appropriate steps 
to make itself an accessible, understandable institution of government, 
thus widening the gap between public perception and reality within the 
justice system. 4 
In truth, however, in at least one notable way, the U.S. Supreme 
Court has shown itself to be quite deeply committed to media access and 
resolute in acknowledging the virtues of press reportage: In deciding 
cases brought before it involving media coverage of other institutions, 
the Court has taken a remarkably strong stance in favor of openness and 
in praise of the journalistic endeavor. Indeed, it is only when making its 
own internal policy determinations about the propriety of press access, 
rather than legal proclamations about the overarching value of that access 
in a democracy, that the Court appears to reverse course and take a less 
media-friendly position. 
This Article examines this apparent disconnect. It aims both to 
illustrate the seeming inconsistency and to initiate a dialogue about its 
possible causes and potential effects. The Article outlines the ways in 
which, generally speaking, the U.S. Supreme Court Justices, in their role 
as articulators of legal doctrine in judicial opinions, have been largely 
press-positive and access-supportive, and contrasts this with the ways in 
which these same Justices, in their role as establishers of their own 
institutional media policies and in their positions as individual 
seats cannot accommodate the 100 million Americans who may be interested in those proceedings"); 
Liptak, supra note 2 (noting that the head of C-SPAN wrote to the Chief Justice the day after the 
case was accepted, seeking permission to broadcast oral argument); Americans Favor Televising 
Supreme Court Healthcare Law Case, GALLUP POLL NEWS SERVICE, Dec. 9, 20 II, at l (reporting 
that seventy-two percent of Americans believed oral arguments should have been televised in the 
case). 
4. Rachel Luberda, The Fourth Branch of the Government: Evaluating the Media's Role in 
Overseeing the Independent Judiciary, 22 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 507, 519 (2008) 
(arguing the Court "create[s] a barrier that often inhibits media scrutiny" and that this "makes room 
for misinterpretation of the Court's legal reasoning and for opportunities for subjectivity in 
reporting"). Polls and studies have consistently shown that the public's perception of the Court is far 
removed rrom reality. See, e.g., ROBERT J. McKEEVER, THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: A 
POLITICAL AND LEGAL ANAL YS!S Ill (1997) ("Public knowledge of the Court's decisions is also 
low: about three-fifths of Americans cannot describe any Court ruling they like or dislike or 
accurately describe even the Court's great landmark decisions."); THE PEW RESEARCH CTR., 
POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE UPDATE, WELL KNOWN: TWITTER; LITTLE KNOWN: JOHN ROBERTS, 32 
(2010) (showing that only twenty-eight percent of respondents could identity John Roberts as the 
Chief Justice); Fewer than a third of Americans know Supreme Court rulings arefinal, ANNENBERG 
Pus. PoL'Y CTR. (Sept. 13, 2007), 
http://www.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/NewsDetails.aspx?myld=235 (reporting that only 
thirty percent of Americans know that U.S. Supreme Court rulings are final). 
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representatives of a public institution, are largely press-negative and 
access-wary. Because this dichotomy may have ramifications for both 
public education and the flow of information in our constitutional 
democracy, the Article then begins a conversation about possible 
rationales for the variance in the Court's attitudes toward and treatment 
of the media. It suggests that although the Court's concerns about 
institutional legitimacy and detachment from political pressures are 
admirable, they may not warrant as significant a gulf as currently exists 
between the Court's case-law position on the press and its internal-policy 
position on the press. 
Part II describes the substantial corpus of case law, particularly in the 
last fifty years, that suggests a Supreme Court view of the press as a 
positive, public-serving entity to be both accommodated and celebrated. 
It demonstrates the ways in which the Court has promoted media access 
as a critically important component of American democracy. 
Part III outlines the most common criticisms leveled against the 
Supreme Court on the question of press access, focusing on the 
suggestion that the Justices create major barriers to the institution and its 
public-serving work. It illustrates the patterns of the Justices 
institutionally declining to accommodate the needs of reporters, as the 
Court sets policy for media coverage of oral argument and other aspects 
of its operations. It also discusses ways in which the Justices individually 
have declined to do so, as journalists have sought to report upon a 
Justice's public appearances or actions. 
Part IV investigates possible explanations for the seeming 
contradiction and conducts an initial analysis of the strength of these 
justifications. Part V concludes with a recommendation that the Court 
seek to more closely align its internal policies on issues of media access 
with the thoughtful commentary in its own case law about the 
overarching virtues of the press in our society. 
II. 
In the last fifty years, the United States Supreme Court has issued 
numerous landmark decisions focused on the role of the press in 
democratic society. It has praised the media for its watchdog role,5 
extolled the virtues of a free press, 6 called for public transparency and 
5. See Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439,447 (1991). 
6. See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 539 (1965) ("The free press has been a mighty catalyst 
in awakening public interest in governmental affairs, exposing corruption among public officers and 
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accountability, 7 and highlighted the ways in which a vigorous press and 
unfettered reporting facilitate these important values. 8 Indeed, although 
the trend certainly is not uniform, 9 and some have recently suggested a 
waning trajectory, 10 on the whole, the Court's jurisprudence has been 
exceptionally press-friendly from the Warren Court to the present. The 
last half century is an era that has given us such watershed media cases 
as New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 11 Bartnicki v. Vopper, 12 Cox 
Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 13 Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 14 
employees and generally informing the citizenry of public events and occurrences, including court 
proceedings."). 
7. See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 99 (2003) (noting that especially in the criminal justice 
system, "[t]ransparency is essential to maintaining public respect"). 
8. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 587 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring) 
("[F]ree and robust reporting, criticism, and debate can contribute to public understanding of the rule 
of law and to comprehension of the functioning of the entire criminal justice system, as well as 
improve the quality of that system by subjecting it to the cleansing effects of exposure and public 
accountability."). 
9. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665,667,708--09 (1972) (rejecting a First Amendment 
privilege for reporters to refuse to testify before a grand jury regarding confidential sources); Estes, 
381 U.S. 532 at 534·-35 (holding that permitting a television broadcast of a sensational Texas 
criminal trial deprived the defendant of his due process); see also Citizens United v. Fed. Election 
Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 905 (2010) (quoting Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 
U.S. 652, 691 ( 1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting)) (suggesting that the Court has "consistently rejected the 
proposition that the institutional press has any constitutional privilege beyond that of other 
speakers"). 
10. See David A. Anderson, Freedom of the Press, 80 TEX. L. REV. 429, 506 (2002) ("It is 
not at all clear that the press as an institution specially protected by law will survive. In the opinions 
of the Supreme Court, 'freedom of the press' peaked nearly half a century ago."); Erwin 
Chemerinsky, The Roherts Court and Freedom of Speech, 63 Fl'D. COMM. L.J. 579, 582-84 (20 II) 
(arguing that the Roberts Court First Amendment jurisprudence will result in further restrictions on 
speech and the press); Amy Gajda, Judging Journalism: The Turn Toward Priva(v and Judicial 
Regulation of the Press, 97 CALIF. L. REV. I 039, I 080 (2009) (arguing that some revealing cases 
"could signal a tum at the Supreme Court in favor of personal privacy and against press freedoms"). 
II. 376 U.S. 254, 256, 269-273 (1964) (holding that the freedom of speech in the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments, along with "a profound national commitment to the principle that debate 
on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open," offers a high level of protection to 
the press in a libel suit brought by a public official). 
12. 532 U.S. 514, 517-18, 534 (2001) (holding that the press cannot be punished when it 
publishes information of public importance it legally obtains from a third party who came into 
possession of the information illegally, because "privacy concerns give way when balanced against 
the interest in publishing matters of public importance"). 
13. 420 U.S. 469, 471,496-97 (1975) (holding that a state cannot punish the press when it 
publishes a rape victim's name when that information was obtained from public records). 
14. 485 U.S. 46, 56 ( 1988) (holding that in order to protect the tree tlow of 1deas and 
opinions on matters of public interest and concem, "public figures and public officials may not 
recover for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress" in the absence of actual malice). 
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Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 15 and the Press-Enterprise 
cases, 16 all insisting upon government openness and media access and 
freedom. This is a Court that, at least when its judicial robes are on, quite 
regularly sides with press-freedom values, even when those values are at 
odds with other values society ordinarily wishes to see protected quite 
vigorously, like the rights of criminal defendants, 17 reputational rights, 18 
and rights of privacy. l9 
The Court's press friendliness extends beyond its actual holdings to 
the general tone that it has used in referencing the press. Time and 
again-in cases all across the media law spectrum-the Supreme Court 
has offered up various forms of a media-praising speech that casts 
journalists in a heroic role of civic virtue. Repeatedly, the Court has 
highlighted the way in which the press plays a role as a check on 
government, 20 the essential function it serves in our democracy, 21 and 
15. 448 U.S. 555, 558, 581 ( 1980) (holding that, absent an extraordinary showing, criminal 
trials must be open to the public and press). 
16. Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court (Press Enterprise[), 464 U.S. 501, 503, 508 (1984) 
(holding that voir dire examinations are presumptively open to the public and the press); Press-Enter. 
Co. v. Superior Court of Cal. for Riverside Cnty. (Press Enterprise If), 478 U.S. I, 3, 12, 15 (1986) 
(extending the reasoning of Press Enterprise I to preliminary hearings). 
17. See Richmond New.spapers, 448 U.S. at 580-81 (holding that the public "right to attend 
criminal trials is implicit in the guarantees of the First Amendment" and that defendants, therefore, 
cannot exclude the public from a criminal trial without producing evidence of unfairness) (citation 
omitted). 
18. See Hustler, 485 U.S. at 53 (articulating, in response to a tort victim's claim of 
intentional emotional distress, that although "a bad motive may be deemed controlling for purposes 
of tort liability in other areas of the law, we think the First Amendment prohibits such a result in the 
area of public debate about public figures"); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272 (1964) 
(quoting Sweeney v. Patterson, 128 F.2d 457,458 (1942)) (explaining that the public interest in free 
speech "outweighs" competing interests in public-official libel claims). 
19. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 534 (2001) ("[P)rivacy concerns give way when 
balanced against the interest in publishing matters of public importance."); Cox Broad. Corp. v. 
Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 494-95 (1975) (recognizing that "interests in privacy fade when the 
information involved already appears on the public record [and] ... when viewed in terms of the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments and in light of the public interest in a vigorous press"). 
20. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214,219 (1966) ('Thus the press serves and was designed to 
serve as a powerful antidote to any abuses of power by governmental officials and as a 
constitutionally chosen means for keeping officials elected by the people responsible to all the 
people whom they were selected to serve."); N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 
( 1971) (Black, J., concurring) ("The Government's power to censor the press was abolished so that 
the press would remain forever free to censure the Government."). 
21. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 184-85 (1979) (noting, in a case involving a television 
investigative news program, that "[i)n its instrumental aspect, the First Amendment serves to foster 
the values of democratic self-government" by "shield[ing] those who would censure the state or 
expose its abuses."); N.Y. Times, 403 U.S. at 717 (Black, J., concurring) {"[T]he Founding Fathers 
gave the free press the protection it must have to fulfill its essential role in our democracy."); Craig 
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the critical part it plays in the discussion of public affairs. 22 We are told 
by the Justices that the press serves as a "powerful antidote to any abuses 
of power" and is a "constitutionally chosen means for keeping 
[government] responsible"23 to those it serves and keeping the public 
informed of important democratic developments. 
In Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, for example, the Court praised 
the media's critical role as surrogate, cited its importance to public 
understanding of the law and criminal justice, and speculated that this 
justified priority entry and special seating for the valuable institution of 
the press. 24 In Time, Inc. v. Hill, the Court declared that American 
society "places a primary value on freedom of speech and of press."25 In 
Cox Broadcasting v. Cohn, 26 the Court emphasized that without the 
press, citizens would be unable to vote intelligently or register thoughtful 
opinions: 27 "[I]n a society in which each individual has but limited time 
and resources with which to observe at first hand the operations of his 
government, he relies necessarily upon the press to bring to him in 
convenient form the facts of those operations."28 The Court noted the 
"great responsibility" of the press and suggested that the ability of the 
media to "report fully and accurately the proceedings of government" is 
central to our constitutional democracy. 29 
In Sheppard v. Maxwell, the Court called the press the "handmaiden 
of effective judicial administration."30 It emphasized that this important 
role "required that the press have a free hand," even when its editorial 
decisions were thought by the Court to be unwise. 31 According to the 
Court, the "unqualified prohibitions laid down by the framers were 
intended to give to liberty of the press ... the broadest scope that could 
v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 383 (1947) (Murphy, J., concurring) ("A free press lies at the heart of our 
democracy and its preservation is essential to the survival of liberty."); Associated Press v. United 
States, 326 U.S. I, 20 (1945) ("[A] free press is a condition of a free society."). 
22. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967) (noting that the freedom of a free press to 
comment on public affairs is "essential ... to healthy government"); Mills, 384 U.S. at 219 ("The 
Constitution specifically selected the press ... to play an important role in the discussion of public 
affairs."). 
23. Mills, 384 U.S. at 219. 
24. 448 U.S. 555, 573 (1980). 
25. 385 U.S. at 388. 
26. 420 U.S. 469 (1975). 
27. !d. at 492. 
28. /d.at491. 
29. /d. at 491-92. 
30. 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966). 
31. !d. 
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be countenanced in an orderly society."32 Importantly, the Court in 
Sheppard acknowledged-as it has since repeated elsewhere-that the 
workings of the judiciary are matters of public concern33 and that press 
coverage ofthis branch is likewise invaluable.34 
And in New York Times v. Sullivan, the Court reached its watershed 
holding by way of a formidable exposition of the power, promise, and 
purpose of the press in a free society. Quoting Madison, the opinion 
asserted that in every state in the Union "the press has exerted a freedom 
in canvassing the merits and measures of public men, of every 
description .... On this footing the freedom of the press has stood; on 
this foundation it yet stands."35 
III. 
And yet, in their own dealings with the press-when they are the 
"public men of every description"-the Court and its Justices have often 
been accused of being significantly more circumspect, and sometimes 
overtly hostile, creating major barriers to press access to the institution 
and its work, and declining to accommodate the needs of reporters who 
endeavor to cover the activities of the judicial branch and its most 
prominent actors. 
Indeed, the Court has regularly been faulted for being isolated, 
secluded, and withdrawn. These criticisms have been lobbed at the Court 
both (1) institutionally, for its official policies on media access to its oral 
arguments and on the release of its opinions to the press, and, (2) with 
few exceptions, individually, for the Justices' unwillingness to allow or 
accommodate coverage of their out-of-Court activities or of speeches at 
public events in which they participate. Each will be addressed in turn. 
A. Critiques of the Court as an Institution 
Institutionally, as one commentator summarized, the press is 
"accepted but not courted."36 There is substantial evidence that reporters 
32. !d. (quoting Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 265 ( 1941 )) (alteration in original). 
33. Landmark Commc'ns, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 839 ("The operations of the courts 
and the judicial conduct of judges are matters of utmost public concern."). 
34. !d. at 839 (quoting Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. at 289 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)) 
(noting that "the law gives '[j]udges as persons, or courts as institutions ... no greater immunity 
from criticism than other persons or institutions") (alteration in original). 
35. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,275 (1964) (emphasis added). 
36. DAVID L. GREY, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE NEWS MEDIA 47 (1968). 
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are viewed as unavoidable fixtures to be endured, but that they are not 
warmly welcomed, and certainly not enthusiastically assisted. 
At least some press policies at the Supreme Court arguably show a 
total indifference to the needs of the media-with useful information 
rarely provided, and when it is provided, coming long after it would be 
useful to those turning around news on a modem deadline. Video 
coverage is flatly denied. 37 Even when the Court finally decided to 
provide audio recordings, the decision was slow in coming, and its initial 
policy of hand-picking only certain presumably important cases for the 
public to hear underscored its reticence and had the unfortunate effect of 
reemphasizing that all of the rest of the cases were off limits. 38 The 
Justices ultimately landed on a policy that releases the audio at the end of 
the workweek, when the news cycle has long since passed. 39 Indeed, 
when the highest Courts of other nations in the world were well into their 
experiences with video coverage and moving on to examining other 
modem technology,40 the U.S. Supreme Court Justices were debating 
37. Visitor Etiquette, Sur. CT. U.S., http://www.supremecourt.gov/visitingl 
visitorservices.aspx (last visited Mar. 15, 2012) ("No photography or video recording is permitted 
inside the Courtroom."); see, e.g., Kenneth W. Starr, Open Up High Court to Cameras, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 3, 2011, at A25; On Cameras in Supreme Court, Souter Says, 'Over My Dead Body', N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 30, 1996, at A24 (quoting Justice Souter: "I can tell you the day you see a camera come 
into our courtroom, it's going to roll over my dead body."). 
38. While the Supreme Court has recorded oral arguments since 1955, use of the audio was 
initially limited to the justices and their clerks, with some access granted to researchers. Recordings 
of the Court, OYEZ.ORG, http://oyez.org/about (last visited Mar. 15, 20 12). The Court did not grant 
public access to these archived recordings until the early 1990s. /d. Even then, release of the 
recordings was delayed until the following term. See Editorial, Your Court in Action, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 21, 2010, at A38. Finally, starting with Bush v. Gore and Grutter v. Bollinger, the Court 
decided to release same-day audio recordings for highly publicized cases of the Court's own 
choosing. Linda Greenhouse, Justices Enter the Radio Age, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2003, at WK2. 
39. Press Release, Sur. CT. OF THE U.S., (Sept. 28, 2010), available at 
http://www. sup rem ecourt. go v /pub li cin fo/press/vi ewpressre leases.asp x ?F i I eN am e=pr _ 09-2 8-
IO.html; Argument Audio, Sur. CT. U.S., http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/ 
argument_audio.aspx (last visited Mar. 15, 2012); see also Tony Mauro, Supreme Court Will 
Release Argument Audio on Delayed Basis, BLOG LEGAL TIMES (Sept. 28, 2010, 2:30 PM), 
http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/20 I 0/09/supreme-court-will-release-argument-audio-on-delayed-
basis.html (explaining the new policy as "a move that virtually ensures the justices' voices won't 
tum up in news reports except in Sunday talk shows or later when the decision is released"). 
40. See Beverley McLachlin, Chief Justice of Can., Remarks: The Relationship Between the 
Courts and the Media (Jan. 31, 2012) (transcript available at http://www.scc-csc.gc.ca/court-
cour/ju/spc-dislbm2012-0 1-31-eng.asp) ('The Supreme Court of Canada has permitted television 
coverage of all its hearings since the mid-1990s The Supreme Court's experience with 
television and webcasting has been positive."); David K. Malcolm, Judicial Independence and 
Accountability, 48 FED. LAW. 42, 48 (2001) ("[T]elevising of some court proceedings is generally 
permitted in many jurisdictions, both common and civil law, across the world."); see generally 
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whether to allow pens,41 and facing criticism for dragging their feet in 
the development of a simple plan for releasing same-day written 
transcripts of oral arguments.42 
Likewise, the Court has been criticized for its insensitivity to media 
realities in the way it releases to the public the Justices' opinions in 
decided cases. The release of decisions is often viewed as having a feast-
or-famine dynamic, 43 with the Court providing no access at all to its 
work product for long stretches of time and then providing more than 
could possibly be digested by any journalist or any would-be informed 
member of the public,44 as the Court releases decisions in numerous 
cases of widespread import all at once, often in the final days of the term. 
In contrast to the massive public-information machines of its 
concomitant branches of government, which hold regular briefings and 
Daniel Stepniak, Technology and Public Access to Audio-Visual Coverage and Recordings of Court 
Proceedings: Implications/or Common Law Jurisdictions, 12 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 791 (2004) 
(outlining the electronic recording and transmission policies of several jurisdictions). In May 2011, 
the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom launched an internet website designed to allow its 
proceedings to be watched in real time. Press Notice. Supreme Court of the UK, "Justice being seen 
to he done" with launch of "Supreme Court TV," (May 16, 20 II), available at 
http://www.supremecourt.gov.uk/docs/pr_ll 06.pdf. 
41. See Tony Mauro, "In Other News . .. ": Developments at the Supreme Court in the 20112-
2003 Term That You Won't Read About in the U.S. Reports, 39 TULSA L. REV. II, 15 (2003) ("[T]he 
Court dropped its longstanding policy against note-taking by public spectators in the Court chamber 
during public sessions. From roughly November of 2002 on, Court police officers no longer 
enforced this baffling rule."). 
42. See Charles Lane, High Court to Post Same-Day Transcripts, WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 
2006, at A08 (announcing the Court's new policy of posting same-day oral argument transcripts, 
"which law professors, lawyers and reporters have been urging for years"); Transcripts and 
Recordings of Oral Arguments, U.S. SUP. CT., 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/availabilityoforalargumenttranscripts.aspx (last 
visited May 5, 2012). 
43. See, e.g., Stephen J. Wermiel, News Media Coverage oj"the United States Supreme Court, 
42 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. I 059, I 073 ( 1998) ("For years, the Supreme Court press corps has asked the 
Court to spread the decisions out in a more measured way in May and June so that the news media 
has more days on which to digest the opinions and more newspaper space or air time to devote to the 
reporting."). 
44. See Greenhouse, Telling the Court's Story: Justice and Journalism at the Supreme Court, 
supra note I, at 1558 ("The last day of the 1987-1988 Term was a journalistic nightmare that has 
attained the status of legend. The Court issued nine decisions that filled 446 pages in the United 
States Reports, including a number of important cases and one, the decision that upheld the 
independent counsel statute, of landmark significance."); Tony Mauro, The Chief and Us: Chief 
Justice William Rehnquist, the News Media, and the Need for Dialogue Between Judges and 
Journalists, 56 SYRACUSE L. REV. 407,408 (2006); Hon. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Informing the Public 
About the U.S. Supreme Court's Work, 29 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 275,281 (1998) ("It is not uncommon, 
on days in June, for the Court to release in one fell swoop six or even more opinions, consuming 
over I 00 pages in the small print of U.S. Law Week."). 
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schedule interviews with Senators, Representatives, the President, and 
legislative and executive staff, the Supreme Court has a very small 
Public Information Office with duties that are almost totally 
"ministerial."45 The office has "neither the authority nor the inclination 
to comment substantively" on any matters before the Court or any 
decision handed down by it. 46 The Public Information Office instead is 
essentially a document delivery entity, distributing the lists of cases the 
Court has decided to hear, its calendar of oral arguments, the briefs that 
parties have submitted, and ultimately, the full opinions of the Justices in 
each decided case with no official summary or other assistance in 
processing their content.47 The Justices themselves do not routinely grant 
interviews, so reporters who cover the Supreme Court work without the 
benefit of what is otherwise the most "obvious journalistic technique"48 
and "live in professional isolation from their subjects, gleaning 
information vicariously through legal documents."49 
Critics have asserted that the challenge of reporting on the Court is 
heightened as the opinions of the Court become longer and more 
complicated, 50 and thus increasingly difficult to digest on a deadline. 51 
45. Jamieson, supra note I, at 8; Ginsburg, supra note 44. at 276 ("Since I 973, the U.S. 
Supreme Court has had a full-time Public Information Officer. today aided by a staff of four."). 
46. Jamieson, supra note I, at 8; see also Wermiel, supra note 43, at 1071 (noting that the 
Public Information Officer "does not as a general rule explain the Court's actions or comment on the 
decisions"). 
47. The opinions are issued with a "syllabus" summarizing the facts and holding of the case, 
but the Court stresses that the syllabus is not authoritative. In most opinions, the Court states before 
the syllabus: 'The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by 
the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader," citing United States v. Detroit Timber 
& Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 32I, 337 (1906). 
48. Greenhouse, Telling the Court's Story: Justice and Journalism at the Supreme Court, 
supra note I, at I543. 
49. Jamieson, supra note I, at 9; see also Mauro, supra note 44, at 4I I ("1, for one, have 
probably had no more than twenty-five conversations with Justices in twenty-five years of covering 
the Court, and only one on the record."). The major exception to this dynamic appears to be when a 
Justice has a book to promote. Editorial, The Supreme Court Club, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2008, at 
A22 (indicating that the Justices increasingly grant interviews under these circumstances). 
50. See Chemerinsky, supra note IO, at 579-80 (indicating that the length of opinions has 
consistently increased every year, and discussing the difficulty of summarizing opinions that exceed 
200 pages); see also Greenhouse, Thinking About the Supreme Court After Bush v. Gore, supra note 
I, at 439 ("[A]n educated person ought to be able to pick up a Supreme Court opinion, make sense 
of the reasoning, find a clear bottom line, and count the vote, without making a two-color chart."). 
51. See Luberda, supra note 4, at 524 ("[T]he Court may also assist the media by making its 
opinions more accessible. This can be achieved by crafting what would otherwise be complicated 
legal reasoning in a more 'readily obtainable' and 'understandable' fashion."). 
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Landmark cases like Bush v. Gore 52 have revealed some of the obstacles 
that reporters face as they attempt to report the holdings of cases as 
quickly and efficiently as possible. These concerns were renewed and 
amplified recently as the Court released its opinions in the cases 
challenging the Affordable Care Act. Despite requests from the press and 
the parties, the Court opted not to email the opinion to the parties, 
including the government, at the time of the announcement. 53 Instead, 
the Court relied on its website for distribution of the opinions, which 
were to be posted just after the beginning of their announcement from the 
bench. 54 At the time of the announcement, however, the Court's 
"website [was] the subject of perhaps greater demand than any other site 
on the Internet- ever," and so the site crashed, leaving the only copies of 
the opinion with those reporters in the Supreme Court pressroom who 
had hard copies. 55 Even the White House was left in the dark. 56 
In a desperate attempt to report on the case first, two major cable 
news networks announced the holding incorrectly. 57 For more than five 
minutes, before the networks finally corrected themselves, both stations' 
banners misleadingly read that the act was invalidated. 58 It has been 
52. Reporters have described the chaotic circumstances they faced while trying to report the 
court decision that would determine the presidential election. Greenhouse, Thinking About the 
Supreme Court After Bush v. Gore, supra note I, at 435 ("We received no guidance from the Court 
staff as to when a decision might come. The breathless waiting, interrupted only by calls from 
increasingly worried editors as deadlines approached, took on a vaguely hallucinogenic quality."); 
Michael Herz, The Supreme Court in Real Time: Haste, Waste, and Bush v. Gore, 35AKRON L. REV. 
185, 185 (2002) ("Network 'runners' ... grabbed copies, dashed outside, and handed them to on-air 
reporters who were waiting in the darkness on the Supreme Court plaza . . . . The reporters then 
ludicrously attempted to understand, synthesize, and explain 65 pages of judicial exposition 
instantaneously. The reporters stumbled badly, and everyone remained in the dark, in every sense."). 
53. Tom Goldstein, We're Getting Wildly Different Assessments, SCOTUSBLOG, (July 7, 
20 12), http:/ /www.scotusblog.com/20 12/07 /were-getting-wildly-differing-assessments/. 
54. /d. 
55. Id. 
56. /d. 
57. Katherine Fung and Jack Mirkinson, Supreme Court Health Care Ruling: CNN, Fox 
News Wrong on Individual Mandate, HUFFINGTON POST, (June 28, 2012, 3:52 PM), 
http :1 /www .huffingtonpost.com/2 0 12/06/2 8/ cnn -supreme-court -health -care-individual-
mandate_n_1633950.html. The stations had not read further into the opinion to discover that the 
mandate was upheld as a tax after being rejected as unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause. 
Goldstein, supra note 53. 
58. Goldstein, supra note 53; Fung & Mirkinson, supra note 57. Once the CNN reporter 
realized the mistake, she apologized, calling the opinion "very confusing [and] large." Id. See 
Orangecountytldems, Complete Train Wreck: CNN Health Care Ruling Fail, Full Video, YouTUBE, 
(June 28, 2012), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LsjHThZmKrw (originally broadcast live on 
CNN) for the broadcast of the erroneous results and the eventual correction on CNN. 
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suggested that those minutes of error resulted in the loss of millions of 
dollars in the stock market59 and confusion for scores of Americans, 
including President Obama60 and members of Congress. 61 
All told, then, press advocates pose some fairly significant 
institutional criticisms regarding the Court's refusal to adjust the way it 
does business. Indeed, these advocates assert, even seemingly minor 
institutional adjustments would have positive benefits for the flow of 
information about the Court from the press to the public and would at 
least arguably be more in keeping with the Court's own statements about 
the virtues ofpress access. 
B. Critiques of the Individual Justices 
Individually, this contrast is arguably just as stark. There are 
numerous historical and current examples of Justices, 62 including those 
who authored or joined strongly press-supportive Court opinions, 
demonstrating resistance to the media or flatly prohibiting press coverage 
of their own public engagements or potentially relevant aspects of their 
lives off the bench. A few stark examples serve to prove this point. 
From the bench, Justice Harry Blackmun joined the press-praising 
Supreme Court majorities in Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 03 
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 64 Minneapolis Star & Tribune 
Co. v. Minn. Comm 'r of Revenue, 65 and Florida Star v. B.J. F. 66 in the 
1970s and 1980s. He famously dissented in Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. 
to assert that the press should even have a First Amendment right to 
59. Goldstein, supra note 53 ("[M]any millions of dollars were gained and lost in the markets 
based on which media reports traders and investors happened to be watching."). 
60. !d. ("At the White House, there is more to the story than the spin that the President 
believed the Administration had lost the case only for a very short period of time. In tact, for at least 
a few minutes he thought the opposite and for more than five minutes, he had substantially worse 
information than many Americans."). 
61. See Mark Hanrahan, Jean Schmidt Reacts to Incorrect Report of Health Care Ruling. 
Screams 'Yes! Yes!', HUFFINGTON POST, (June 29, 2012, II: 16 PM), 
http://www. huffingtonpost.com/20 12/06/29/jean-schmidt -reacts-health-careru ling_n_ I ti3 83 3 5. html 
(showing the extreme reaction of Rep. Jean Schmidt of Ohio as she was erroneously informed that 
the Affordable Care Act was struck down). 
62. For an excellent comprehensive analysis of modem Justices and their relationships with 
the media, and additional details on the illustrations mentioned here, see genera/~v RICHARD DAVIS, 
JUSTICES AND JOURNALISTS (2011). 
63. 427 U.S. 539 (1976). 
64. 418 U.S. 241 (1974). 
65. 4ti0 U.S. 575 ( 1983). 
66. 491 U.S. 524 (1989). 
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break their promises to sources. 67 But Blackmun was anything but a 
champion of press freedom in his actual dealings with the media. He 
routinely declined to release text of his public speeches, 68 testily 
rebuffed press inquiries about his health when treated for prostate 
cancer,69 and flatly refused to respond to reporter inquiries about 
resigning his longtime membership in an all-male club on the eve of the 
Court's hearing a constitutional challenge to such clubs. 70 
From the bench, Chief Justice Warren Burger issued such powerful, 
press-praising opinions as Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,71 
Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 72 and Tornillo. 73 In authoring 
these for the Court, he spoke repeatedly of the "crucial process" of media 
coverage, 74 and the need to protect the "vital constitutional guarantee" of 
a free press. 75 But as Chief Justice, his efforts to open the Court to real 
and meaningful press coverage consisted of little more than agreeing to 
have the "press officer hand out opinions in the pressroom rather than 
blasting them down from the bench through pneumatic tubes."76 In thirty 
years on the bench, he consistently declined to submit to news 
conferences, except in his role as chairman of the Commission on the 
Bicentennial of the U.S. Constitution.77 He "stoutly opposed all 
photographic or broadcast coverage of the ... Court," and even "refused 
to allow television coverage of his otherwise public speeches, such as his 
annual report to the American Bar Association."78 "He once knocked a 
television camera out of the hand of a network cameraman who followed 
him into an elevator," and is reported to have flown into a rage when 
CBS radio and television broadcast portions of the Pentagon Papers case 
67. 501 U.S. 663,675-76 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("[T]he law may not be enforced 
to punish the expression of truthful information or opinion."). 
68. Stuart Taylor Jr., Washington Talk: The Supreme Court; Lifiing of' Secrecy Reveals 
Earthy Side of' Justices, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1988, at A 16. 
69. Philip M. Boffey, Health (Jj'Justices Poses Little Threat to the High Court, N.Y. TIMES, 
(Sept. 20. 1987), at A48. 
70. Taylor, supra note 68, at A 16. 
71. 448 U.S. 555 (1980). 
72. 427 U.S. 539 ( 1976 ). 
73. Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). 
74. !d. at 258. 
75. Nch. Press, 427 U.S. at 570. 
76. JOE MATHFWSON, TilE SUPREME COURT AND THE PRESS: THE INDISPENSABLE CONFLICT 
363 (2011 ). 
77. Wayne King & Warren Weaver Jr., Briefing: Burger and the Press, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 
l986,atAl6. 
78. !d. 
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ten years after the fact using footage kept at the National Archives. 79 
Burger demanded that the archives receive no further recordings. 80 
Justice David Souter absolutely championed the freedom of the press 
in his bold dissent in Cohen v. Cowles. 81 He argued that "freedom ofthe 
press is ultimately founded on the value of enhancing such discourse for 
the sake of a citizenry better informed and thus more prudently self-
govemed."82 The First Amendment, he said, "goes beyond protection of 
the press and the self-expression of individuals to prohibit government 
from limiting the stock of information from which members of the public 
may draw."83 It is of paramount importance, Souter argued, that we be 
able to "register opinions on the administration of government 
generally."84 Yet in his own role as a governmental official, Justice 
Souter's reclusiveness was extreme. When he joined the Court in 1990, 
he met the press corps in a traditional greeting event and stayed only an 
hour before inching to the door. He reportedly called out, "Let's do it 
again when I retire," and then never spoke a word to the press again, 
including when he retired, abandoning the norm of a departing press 
event. 85 He told a congressional committee that the day a camera came 
into the Supreme Court it would be "over [his] dead body."86 
Chief Justice William Rehnquist, despite his generally conservative 
ideology and his frequent role as a dissenter in cases involving the 
expansion of individual liberties, nevertheless found himself joining his 
liberal colleagues when it came to core issues of media rights, including 
prior restraints, gag orders, and other issues of content control and 
access. 87 But as Chief Justice, it appears he was wholly uninterested in 
79. Linda Greenhouse. Nixon Appointee Eased Supreme Court Away From Liberal Era: 
Warren E. Burger. Who Led Supreme Court for 17 Years. Dies at 87, N.Y. TIMES, June 26. 1995. at 
B6; MATHEWSON, supra note 76, at 364. 
80. ld. 
81. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663,676 (1991) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
82. !d. at 678. 
83. !d. (quoting First Nat'! Bank ofBos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978)). 
84. ld. (quoting Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469,492 (1975)). 
85. Tony Mauro, How To Open Up Our Court: Justice Scalia Will Make A Rare TV 
Appearance - But Only to Peddle His Book. The Supreme Court Needs to Find More Innovative 
Ways to Lift Its Cloak of Secrecy, USA TODAY, Apr. 23, 2008, at I; Tony Mauro, No Retirement 
Press Conference for Justice Souter, THE NAT'L L.J. (May 5. 2009), 
http://www.law.com/jsp/scm/PubArticleSCM.jsp?id=l202430428707. 
86. On Cameras in Supreme Court, Souter Says, 'Over My Dead Body', N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
30, 1996. at 24 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
87. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 47, 57 (1988); Press-Enter. Co. v. 
Superior Court (Press Enterprise!), 464 U.S. 501,502, 504--05 (1984); Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 
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improving access to his own institution or in facilitating coverage of 
Court proceedings. He reportedly once told a social gathering of Court 
reporters, "the difference between us and the other branches of 
government is that we don't need you people of the press."88 
No less than William Brennan, the author of both New York Times v. 
Sullivan and Time Inc. v. Hill, was, for most of his career, deeply critical 
of the press and adamantly opposed to working with or accommodating 
them in even minor ways. 89 The same Justice who, in his capacity as 
jurist, extolled the virtues of the press in ensuring that dialogue on public 
matters is "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,"90 himself declined 
almost all interview requests, 91 once shoved an Associated Press 
reporter, 92 called Washington Post reporter Bob Woodward a "skunk,"93 
and replaced his usually gregarious personality with a sharp and scolding 
one whenever the media was involved. 94 He told a crowd at Rutgers 
University that the media consistently misapprehends the issues at stake 
and fails in its task of illuminating issues for the public because "self-
righteousness" and "bitterness" can "cloud[] its vision."95 
Indeed, even among the currently sitting Justices, a majority have 
made statements arguably inconsistent with the press-praising media law 
jurisprudence of our day, strongly suggesting they believe reporters to be 
largely incompetent and disserving to, rather than critical components of, 
public information about our democracy. 96 
153, 155, 176-77 ( 1979); Landmark Commc'n, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 830, 845-46 (1978); 
Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 540, 570 (1976); Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 
U.S. 241,242,258 (1974); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,324 (1974). 
88. MATHEWSON, supra note 76, at 8. 
89. SETH STERN & STEPHEN WERMIEL, JUSTICE BRENNAN: LIBERAL CHAMPION 461 (2010). 
90. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,270 (1964). 
91. STERN & WERMIEL, supra note 89, at 46 I. 
92. ld. 
93. /d.at463. 
94. !d. at461-62. 
95. ld. at 462-63. 
96. Soon after he joined the Court, Justice Samuel Alito said in a speech that the "news 
media typically oversimplifies and sensationalizes." John Heiiprin, Scalia Sees Shift in Court's Role, 
WASH. POST, Oct. 23, 2006, at Al9. He bemoaned the existence of the Internet because the 
spreading of misinformation by the press more broadly takes a toll on the judiciary. I d. In a separate 
address, he said that most of what people read and hear about the Supreme Court is misleading or 
just plain wrong. William H. Freivogel, A/ito Talks Media With Lawyers in St. Louis, GATEWAY 
JOURNALISM REVIEW (May 23, 2011), http://gatewayjr.org/ 2011/05/23/alito-talks-media-with-
lawyers-in-st-louis/. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg quoted Felix Frankfurter in urging the press to 
cover the Court "as least as well as it covers the World Series." Frank J. Murray, Ginsburg Finds 
Full Court Press Lacking in Clarity, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1995, at A3. Ginsburg has publicly 
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As a descriptive matter, then, there is an at least apparent divide 
between what the Justices as Justices say about the role of the press in 
our society and the virtues of press access and what the Justices as 
individual or institutional decision-makers do when making their own 
choices about press access. 
IV. 
As an explanatory matter, however, the question is significantly 
more complicated. The seemingly conflicting stances taken by the 
Justices in their personal and institutional determinations on press access 
are likely the product of one or more potential explanations rooted in the 
perceived uniqueness of the Court. Plainly, the Justices genuinely believe 
themselves to be somehow different, and believe the question of press 
access to them and their work to be somehow different than the contexts 
to which they are speaking in their press-praising, access-supporting 
judicial opinions. A combination of structural, constitutional, and 
practical justifications provide possible explanations for the press-access 
divide and should form the basis of a larger discussion on the question. 
argued that the press is not a good translator and that it over-interprets unimportant actions, 
inappropriately forecasts outcomes, and overstates the significance of certiorari denials. !d. Its work, 
she has said, is "more eye-catching than significant." !d. Justice Anthony Kennedy, despite waxing 
more eloquent than any other sitting Justice on First Amendment freedoms, has taken perhaps the 
strongest stance against cameras at the Supreme Court of any sitting Justice and recently gave a 
speech in which he criticized both daily news reporters and editorial writers. Charles Lane, 
Kennedy's Assault on Editorial Writers, WASH. PosT, Apr. 3, 2006, at A 17. Justice Clarence 
Thomas has publicly referred to members of the media as "smart-aleck commentators," "snot-nosed 
brats," "talking heads who shout at each other," and "snotty-nosed smirks." "Snotty-nosed" Cynics 
Blasted in a Speech by Justice Thomas, THE FRESNO BEE, Sept. 15, 2008, at A9. Thomas repeatedly 
asks that his speeches be closed to the media because he "just wants it to be among friends." 
RICHARD DAVIS, JUSTICES AND JOURNALISTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE MEDIA 185 (20 II). 
Most colorfully, Justice Antonin Scalia said in a recent speech, "The press is never going to report 
judicial opinions accurately .... They're just going to report, who is the plaintiff? Was that a nice 
little old lady? And who is the defendant? Was this, you know, some scuzzy guy'l And who won? 
Was it the good guy that won or the bad guy?" Heilprin, supra, at Al9 (emphasis added). Justice 
Scalia has also expressed a surety that the broadcast media could not be trusted to accurately convey 
the goings-on of the Court if cameras were permitted in the courtroom. See Tal Kopan, Scalia: 
Cameras in Supreme Court Would 'Mis-educate' Americans, POLITICO (July 26, 2012, 5:37PM), 
http :I I www. politico .com/b I o gslunder -the-radar 12 0 1210 7 I seal i a -cam eras-in -supreme-court-wou I d-
miseducate-americans- !30246.html. Scalia has insisted that "[t]he First Amendment has nothing to 
do with whether we have to televise our proceedings." !d. 
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A. The Countermajoritarian Difference? 
One possibility is that the Justices are constitutionally different-that 
the rights-promoting, access-encouraging language of these media law 
opinions is speaking to the politically accountable elected branches, 
while the Court remains the so-called "least dangerous branch" that is 
structurally permitted-indeed, mandated-to be countermajoritarian.97 
Under this explanation, all of the language from the Supreme Court 
speaking to the need for press access as a vehicle to democratic dialogue 
and emphasizing the need to ensure that debate on public issues is 
"uninhibited, robust and wide-open"98 applies only to the political 
branches of government, whose work product is designed to be tempered 
by the electorate. Conversely, when we speak of the judiciary, whose 
sole power is its own legitimacy99 and whose tasks are the delicate ones 
97. See ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT 
THE BAR OF POLITICS 16--17 ( 1962) (noting that judicial review promulgates undemocratic outcomes 
by allowing unelected judges to "thwart" legislative enactments and to "exercise[] control, not in 
behalf of the prevailing majority, but against it"); THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 393, 397 (Alexander 
Hamilton) (Bantam Classic ed. 1982) (an independent judiciary with life tenure is necessary "to 
guard the constitution and the rights of individuals from the effects of those ill humours which the 
arts of designing men, or the influence of particular conjunctures, sometimes disseminate among the 
people themselves "and is an "excellent barrier to the encroachments and oppressions of the 
representative body."); see also Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 
Part One. The Road to Judicial Supremacy, 73 NYU. L. REV. 333, 344 (1998) ("[T]he Framers 
appear to have constructed the judiciary in deliberately counterrnajoritarian fashion."). 
98. NY Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,270 (1964). 
99. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865 (1992) (plurality opinion) 
("The Court's power lies, rather, in its legitimacy, a product of substance and perception that shows 
itself in the people's acceptance of the Judiciary as fit to determine what the Nation's law means and 
to declare what it demands."); see THE FEDERALIST No. 78 supra note 97, at 393-94 (describing the 
judiciary as the "least dangerous" branch because it "has no influence over either the sword or the 
purse, no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society, and can take no active 
resolution whatever."). 
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of judicial review and protection of minority interests, 100 the media-
access calculus would come out differently. 101 
Plainly, the value of judicial independence is substantial. Any 
encroachment on the ability of the judiciary to act in its role of applying 
the Constitution's commands without regard to public preference is to be 
assiduously avoided. 102 The reality or perception of the U.S. Supreme 
Court as a governmental institution that should align itself with the 
current will of the populace or react to majority pressures is harmful to 
the very essence of our system of separation of powers. 103 But it is not 
I 00. See W. Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 ( 1943) ("The very 
purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political 
controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal 
principles to be applied by the courts."); see also United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 318 
( 1990) ("[ A]ny suggestion that the Government's interest in suppressing speech becomes more 
weighty as popular opposition to that speech grows is foreign to the First Amendment."); Emp't 
Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 902 ( 1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring) 
("[T]he First Amendment was enacted precisely to protect the rights of those whose religious 
practices are not shared by the majority and may be viewed with hostility."); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS: LiMITS ON GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY 
896 ( 1978) (noting that courts "must ultimately define and defend rights against government in terms 
independent of consensus or majority will"); Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and 
Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 VA. L. REV. I, I (1996) ("It is common wisdom that a fundamental 
purpose of judicial review is to protect minority rights from majoritarian overreaching."). 
101. This difference has perhaps been invoked most vigorously in the context of the debate 
over cameras at the Court. Justice Anthony Kennedy has remarked that "[w]e teach, by having no 
cameras, that we are different." Cameras in the Court, C-SPAN, http://www.c-span.org/The-
Courts/Cameras-in-The-Court/ (last visited May, 14, 2012). Justice Antonin Scalia has stated that 
"[ o ]ne of the traditions of the American judiciary ... Is not to thrust itself be tore the public ... I 
think some of the Justices would feel that value, among others, would be somewhat compromised by 
televising all of the proceedings." !d. q: Bruce G. Peabody, "Supreme Court TV": Televising the 
Least Accountable Branch?, 33 J. LEGIS. 144, 155 (2007) ("[O]bjecting to greater public exposure to 
the Court through televised proceedings seems to be anti-democratic .... "). 
I 02. Breyer, supra note 1, at I 088 ("We are all fully conscious of the need for fair and 
independent judicial processes, as an essential guarantee for many other basic human liberties. We 
are also fully conscious of the need for free speech and free press, which are also necessary 
guarantees in a democratic government. Sometimes these necessities coincide; other times they do 
not."); Stephen B. Burbank, The Architecture of Judicial Independence, 72 S. Cal. L. Rev. 315, 316-
17 (1998) ([C]urrent battles about judicial independence ... threaten the role of law in American 
society and hence this society's fundamental aspirations."); Hon. Sandra Day O'Connor, Judicial 
Independence and 21st-Century Challenges, 29 DEL. LAW. 8, 9 (2011) ("Th[e] revolutionary 
promise-that our government would be structurally restrained from the impulsive abuses of power 
that might otherwise occur-can only be fulfilled if the judicial power is kept distinct from the 
political branches."). 
103. See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811,829 (1997) (quoting United States v. Richardson, 418 
U.S. 166, 192 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring)) ("The irreplaceable value of the power articulated by 
Mr. Chief Justice Marshall ... lies in the protection it has afforded the constitutional rights and 
liberties of individual citizens and minority groups against oppressive or discriminatory 
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clear that these truths about the countermajoritarian nature of the Court 
either necessitate or justify the divide between its press-friendly 
statements in judicial opinions and its relatively inhospitable treatment of 
the press institutionally and individually. There are at least three ways in 
which this "countermajoritarian" difference between the Court and other 
branches of government provide a less than satisfactory explanation for 
the media-access dichotomy. 
First, as a practical matter, it might well be argued that the Justices' 
unique independence makes close journalistic coverage of their 
proceedings "more justifiable, not less so," 104 than coverage of other 
government institutions. As Tony Mauro has thoughtfully argued in the 
context of cameras, even if we assume that broadcast coverage might 
"distort the behavior of elected officials" who must work to please their 
constituents, it should have "little negative effect on contemplative, life-
tenured [Justices] who insist they are apolitical." 105 If the Justices ofthe 
Supreme Court are, in fact, constitutionally different, their unique 
independence should render them "uniquely inattentive to the presence 
of cameras" 106 and to media coverage in general. Given this structural 
difference, we might expect that greater access by the press would be 
welcomed as a public education tool rather than feared as an 
encroachment on judicial independence. 
Second, the suggestion that the other branches of government are 
accountable to an electorate while the judiciary is not does not 
necessarily support exceptionalism on the question of accommodating 
the press in its coverage of the Supreme Court. The understanding that 
the other branches of government are accountable must be paired with an 
understanding of the role the Supreme Court plays in keeping them 
accountable. 107 The electorate does not stop caring about the elected 
branches' decisions and actions once they have been taken. Critically 
important to the voting public's calculation of how satisfactorily these 
government action. It is this role ... that has maintained public esteem for the federal courts and has 
permitted the peaceful coexistence of the countermajoritarian implications of judicial review and the 
democratic principles upon which our Federal Government in the final analysis rests."); Weiss v. 
United States, 510 U.S. 163, 179 (1994) ("[J)udicial independence ... helps to ensure judicial 
impartiality."). 
l 04. Mauro, supra note 2, at 271. 
105. !d. 
106. !d. 
107. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 97, at 395 ("[T]he courts were designed to be 
an intermediate body between the people and the legislature, in order, among other things, to keep 
the latter within the limits assigned to their authority."). 
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officials are serving is whether those selected to perform these duties are 
behaving constitutionally-a determination that happens at the Supreme 
Court. 108 To the extent that voters value legislators who behave 
constitutionality, a full understanding of what happens at the U.S. 
Supreme Court-inevitably provided through the media that cover the 
Court-can help those voters make an informed decision in the voting 
booth. Thus, insofar as the nation's voters want constitutionally behaving 
legislators and executive branch officials, access to and understanding of 
U.S. Supreme Court decisionmaking is beneficial and necessary. 
Third, even accepting the argument that the judiciary is different 
from the other branches for countermajoritarian reasons, this argument 
does not explain the gap between Supreme Court case law regarding the 
media and Supreme Court behavior toward the media, because at least 
some of that case law-indeed, the cases giving rise to the most forceful 
statements on the need for openness to the full public and the importance 
of the role of the press as surrogates to all those who would view their 
government in action-are cases involving press access to the judiciary, 
albeit courts other than the Supreme Court. 109 When the Court has touted 
the core First Amendment purposes of "assuring freedom of 
communication on matters relating to the functioning of government," 110 
it has done so in the context of cases involving access to the work of the 
judiciary. When it has called for openness as a tool for combatting 
"ignorance and distrust ... and suspicion concerning the competence" of 
government officials, 111 it has been speaking to officials in the judicial 
branch. And when it has spoken of media coverage as "enhanc[ing] the 
I 08. Cameras in the Courtroom: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, I 09th Con g. 
7 (2005) (statement of Patrick J. Leahy, U.S. Sen.) ("The Supreme Court is often the final arbiter of 
constitutional questions having a profound effect on all Americans .... [Greater public access] can 
deepen the understanding of the work of the courts, but it can also deepen our understanding that it is 
our rights that are there being protected."). Breyer, supra note I, at I 085 ("A free press is necessary 
to narrate to the public what is being done by those in power, to provide them in a more general way 
with the information necessary to vote and to make other political decisions in an intelligent way."). 
109. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 571 ( 1980) ("[T)he open 
processes of justice serve an important prophylactic purpose, providing an outlet for community 
concern, hostility, and emotion .... The crucial prophylactic aspects of the administration of justice 
cannot function in the dark."); id. at 572 ("People in an open society do not demand infallibility from 
their institutions, but it is difficult for them to accept what they are prohibited from observing."); In 
re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 271 ( 1948) ("[l)n comparison of publicity, all other checks [on trial judges] 
are of small account."); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367,374 (1947) ('There is no special perquisite 
of the judiciary which enables it, as distinguished from other institutions of democratic government, 
to suppress, edit, or censor events which transpire in proceedings before it."). 
II 0. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 575. 
Ill. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 587 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
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integrity and quality of what takes place," 112 it has been referencing 
what takes place in courtrooms. 
It might be argued that the U.S. Supreme Court is not only different 
from the other branches of government but different from the other 
components of its same branch of government, 113 and that the line of 
reasoning that brings about constitutionally mandated access (and, more 
importantly, the sweeping press-praising language 114) in cases involving 
criminal trials or preliminary hearing transcripts is inapt at the highest 
court in the land, where there is little history or tradition of 
accommodating the press. 115 Yet as a functional matter, it is difficult to 
find a principled reason for differentiating lower courts from those that 
hear the appeals of the same cases. It might well be argued that the court 
with the greatest finality, which leaves litigants with no further avenue of 
relief and which interprets and declares law that will be binding for the 
entirety of the nation, 116 should be the place where media access would 
bring the greatest benefits and where the greatest value would be served 
by openness and full coverage. In any event, any argument that it is a 
court that is functionally less important for purposes of flow of 
information to the public rings hollow. 
112. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 578. 
113. The Supreme Court has held that the public and the press have a First Amendment right 
of access to court proceedings if those proceedings are traditionally open, and public access will play 
"a particularly significant positive role in the actual functioning of the process." Press-Enter. Co. v. 
Superior Court (Press-Enterprise II), 4 78 U.S. 1, 10-311 ( 1986). Generally, criminal trials, Globe 
Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 603 (1982); Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 
572, selection of jurors, Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court ("Press-Enterprise !"), 464 U.S. 501, 
506 ( 1984 ), and preliminary hearings have been considered presumptively open. Press-Enterprise II, 
478 U.S. at 10. The presumption can be overcome "only by an overriding interest based on findings 
that closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest." 
Press-Enterprise 1, 464 U.S. at 510. 
114. The Supreme Court has not, of course, fully closed its proceedings or otherwise run afoul 
of the actual First Amendment doctrines of access. Rather, it appears to have developed media 
policies for its own operations that are inconsistent with the press-praising language that emerged 
from cases dealing with constitutional rights of access. 
115. See MATHEWSON, supra note 76, at 10 (arguing that the Court has only made 
accommodations for the press "grudgingly" and "little by little" over the last century); Todd Piccus, 
Demystifving the Least Understood Branch: Opening the Supreme Court to Broadcast Media, 71 
TEX. L. REV. 1053, 1057 (1992) (arguing that despite the accessibility cases of the 1980s the 
Supreme Court remained incomprehensibly closed to broadcast media). 
116. See generally Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring) 
(making the famous observation that "[ wle are not final because we are infallible, but we 
arc infallible only because we arc final"). 
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B. The Image Issue 
Some of the arguments that have been put forth by Justices for 
exceptionalism on the question of press access-and particularly access 
by the broadcast media 117 -appear to rise and fall on questions of image 
preservation. Justices Kennedy and Breyer, for example, both have 
essentially contended that cameras in the U.S. Supreme Court are a bad 
idea because the Justices will be made to look biased, made to look 
foolish, or both. 118 The Justices no doubt worry, in this era of YouTube 
and comedy news programs, that their sometimes funny, off-handed 
comments 119 will become the target ofnationaljokes. 120 
Viewed generously, these image concerns are part and parcel of the 
countermajoritarian judicial independence argument discussed above. 
117. For example, Justice Scalia has recently expressed his belief that the Justices will be 
misportrayed by snippets of broadcast footage in ways that are more harmful than the current 
potential for snippets of quotations in print publications. Kopan, supra note 97 ("People read that 
and they say 'well that's an article in the newspaper and the guy may be lying, or he may be 
misinformed.' But somehow when you see it live ... it has a much greater impact. I am sure it will 
mis-educate the American people[.]") 
118. See Considering the Role of Judges Under the Constitution of the United States: Hearing 
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, !12th Cong. 34 (2011) (statement of Stephen Breyer, Assoc. 
J. of the United States Supreme Court) ("[Y]ou can make people look good or you can make them 
look bad, depending on what 30 seconds you take, and it is already cult and personality, and let us 
not make it worse."); Anthony Kennedy, Interview Response, The Role of the Judiciary: Panel 
Discussion with United States Supreme Court Justices, 25 BERKELEY J. INT'L LAW 71, 85 (2007) 
("There are a number of people who want to make us part of the national entertainment network."). 
119. The blogosphere has had some fun with these comments over the years. In 2009 Justice 
Breyer made headlines when, during oral argument, he admitted that people placed things down his 
underwear in elementary school. Robert Barnes, Supremely Funny: Study Covers Court's Penchant 
for Laughter, WASH. PosT, Jan. 17,2011, at Al3. Justices Roberts and Kennedy received similar 
treatment in 2010 after asking how text messaging worked during oral arguments. Dahlia Lithwick 
& Graham Vyse, Tweet Justice: Should Judges be Using Social Media?, SLATE (Apr. 30, 2010), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/ news_and_politics/jurisprudence/20 I 0/04/tweet_justice.html. In a 
2011 speech Justice Ginsburg mentioned some of the funny comments made during the 2010 term, 
including a hypothetical about a 9,000-foot cow, an inquiry into the counsel's thoughts on Satan, and 
a question about what James Madison thinks of video games. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Assoc. J. of the 
United States Supreme Court, A survey of the 20 I 0 Term, Presentation to the Otsego County Bar 
Association (July 22, 2011) (transcript available at 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/speeches/viewspeeches.aspx?Filename=sp_07-22-
ll.html). She concluded by stating, "From the foregoing samples, you may better understand why 
the Court does not plan to permit televising oral arguments any time soon." /d. 
120. Tellingly, it appears that the only time any of the Justices have ever been the subject of a 
Saturday Night Live sketch has been during confirmation hearings, when they are in front of a 
camera for an extended period of time. Adam Burton, Pay No Attention to the Men Behind The 
Curtain: The Supreme Court, Popular Culture, and the Countermajoritarian Problem, 73 UMKC L. 
REV. 53, 67 (2004). 
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The Justices want to be seen positively-to be viewed as competent, 
neutral, and legitimate arbiters of significant disputes-so as to preserve 
and maintain their important role in the constitutional scheme. 121 Insofar 
as the assertions are made on these grounds, the weaknesses of claiming 
exceptionalism from the level of media access and accommodation that 
the Court's decisions declare as appropriate for its concomitant branches 
of government are discussed above. 
To the extent that the concerns are not constitutionally grounded but 
instead are expressions of individual preferences not to be exposed to the 
downsides of media exposure, the Court's exceptionalism seems 
particularly unwarranted. It is inconsistent for Justices to intimate, time 
and again in judicial opinions, that the press can be trusted not to distort 
the news, and that the occasional distortion is just the cost of doing 
business in a democracy, 122 and then to hold out the possibility of that 
distortion of news about the Court as a reason for cutting off access or 
refusing to accommodate reporters. The doctrinal principle set forth in 
the Court's case law suggests that more access should solve, rather than 
add to, distortion problems, as fuller information would be available to 
the people for consultation in making their judgments. It suggests that the 
counter for this potentially embarrassing or potentially erroneous speech 
should be more speech, not restrictions on the flow of information. 123 
121. Breyer, supra note 118, at 86 (Responding to a question on cameras in the courtroom, 
Justice Breyer said, "[W]e see men and women of every race, every religion, every point of view, 
who have come into our court to resolve their differences ... [a]nd we are trustees of that institution. 
And none of us, I think, wants to do anything to harm that institution."); Luberda, supra note 4, at 
519 ("The Supreme Court's internal motivations when dealing with the media create a barrier that 
often inhibits media scrutiny. These goals include preserving public deference by restricting the 
media's inquiry to opinions, downplaying individual differences among the Justices, and depicting 
the Court as being guided by precedent rather than personal agendas."). 
122. Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491-92 (1975) ("Great responsibility is 
accordingly placed upon the news media to report fully and accurately the proceedings of 
government .... "); Gertz v. Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340-41 ( 1974) ("[P]unishment of error runs 
the risk of inducing a cautious and restrictive exercise of the constitutionally guaranteed freedoms of 
speech and press."); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966) ("A responsible press has 
always been regarded as the handmaiden of effective judicial administration, especially in the 
criminal field. Its function in this regard is documented by an impressive record of service over 
several centuries."); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271-72 (1964) ("That erroneous 
statement is inevitable in free debate, and that it must be protected if the freedoms of expression are 
to have the breathing space that they need to survive.") (citation omitted). 
123. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (famously 
stating that "[i]f there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the 
evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence."); 
see also U.S. v. Alvarez, 132 S.Ct. 2537, 2550 (2012); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 419-20 
(1989); Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 61 (1982); N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 270. 
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The Court is indeed unique as a governmental institution, in that its 
comparatively small size means nine Justices-the self-same people who 
are pressworthy-are able to make determinations about press access 
that serve their individual preferences, even if they do not serve the 
overarching democratic values asserted in the case law. 124 This practical 
motivation may be the truest explanation for the discrepancy between 
what the Court says in its opinions and what it does in its own policies. 
Substantial literature in the fields of psychology and communications 
makes clear that it is truly difficult to be the subject of news reporting, 
even of a positive variety-and that the consequences of fame, notoriety, 
and visibility are personally deep and psychologically broad. 125 Justice 
Byron White once openly admitted that the primary factor driving the 
Court's reclusiveness and his personal distaste for the press was that he 
"selfish[ly]" wanted his anonymity. 126 Others have argued that they will 
feel safer 127 if fewer Americans know about them and their work or see 
their faces on television, 128 a concern that is certainly worthy of 
124. Stephen J. Wermiel, News Media Coverage of the United States Supreme Court, 42 ST. 
LOUIS U. L.J. 1059, 1070-72 (1998) (explaining the methods by which the Supreme Court provides 
and denies access for news media). 
125. See, e.g., Donna Rockwell & David C. Giles, Being a Ce/ebritv: A Phenomenology of 
Fame, 40 J. PHENOMENOLOGICAL PsYCHOL. 178 (2009) (detailing numerous and varied negative 
psychological effects of fame); Mark Schaller, The Psychological Consequences of Fame: Three 
Tests of the Se/j:Consciousness Hypothesis, 65(2) J. PERSONALITY 291 ( 1997) ("[F]ame is stressful 
and unpleasant [and] might even be dangerous."); Mary Loftus, The Other Side of Fame, PSYCHOL. 
TODAY, May I, 1995, at 48 (detailing the top stressors of public figures including lack of privacy, 
constant monitoring, and lack of security). These difficulties are heightened in today's media culture 
where "reverence and restraint are passe," and where "[t]he private lives of public figures are 
flaunted as never before, satisfYing a public that seems to want to know everything about its 
celebrities." Burton, supra note 120, at 64-65. 
126. Mauro, supra note 2, at 266 (quoting Justice White: "I am very pleased to be able to walk 
around, and very, very seldom am I recognized .... It's very selfish, I know.") 
127. Security concerns pose an interesting dilemma. In recent years, several federal judges 
have been physically attacked or harmed, and Justices of the Court have been among them. Most 
recently, Justice Breyer was robbed two times in 2012, one of which was at machete point in his 
vacation home in the Caribbean. Ongoing Case of Burglar v. Breyer, WASH. PoST, May 18, 2012, at 
C02. Justices Souter and Ginsburg also have received death threats, and most prominently, Justice 
White was attacked while giving a speech in Utah in I982. Matthew Chayes, Courtroom Camera 
Bill Stirs Debate, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 30, 2006, at C7. 
128. Justice Thomas has argued that the presence of cameras in the courtroom present greater 
security risks. Departments of Tramportation, Treasury, HUD, the Judiciary. District of Columbia, 
and Independent Agencies Appropriations for 2007: Hearing before a Subcomm. of the H. Comm. 
on Appropriations, I 09th Con g. 225 26 (2006) (statement of Clarence Thomas, Assoc. J. of the 
United States Supreme Court) ("I also think [cameras] will raise additional security concerns as the 
other members of the Court who now have some degree of anonymity, lose that anonymity. I 
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discussion. 129 Importantly, however, nothing in the case law indicates 
that privacy or seclusion preferences on the part of major govemmental 
decision makers trumps press freedom or the desirability of media 
access, and the case law does not suggest that any aspect of the Court's 
work distinguishes the judiciary significantly from the other 
governmental decision makers on this front. 130 
On the question of press coverage of the Justices' out-of-court 
remarks, speeches, and life choices, this same self-preservation instinct 
may likewise be driving much of the approach. The Justices wish to say 
something interesting in their speeches, but they do not want to reflect a 
bias that will be seen as prejudging a case or requiring recusal. 131 
probably have more of a public recognition than any of the current members of the Court, and that 
loss of anonymity raises your security issues considerably."). Security concerns have been a stated 
reason for a lack of progress on legislation before Congress that would mandate the use of cameras 
in oral arguments. Peabody, supra note I 01, at 146. 
129. Physical safety of jurists is plainly an important concern. It is worth noting, however, that 
security concerns have not stopped Justices from appearing on television when they have been 
promoting books or otherwise have chosen to participate in televised programs. Jodi Kantor, Justices 
Sit on flighest Court. hut Still Live Without Top Security, N.Y. TiMES, Feb. 9, 2012, at Al6 ("[T]he 
justices are not the remote figures of the past. Today, they give frequent speeches at law schools and 
bar associations, and they have appeared widely on television, from C-Span to a cameo this month 
by Justice Sonia Sotomayor on 'Sesame Street.' Such appearances undercut the case against 
televised proceedings ... . ");see also The Supreme Court Cluh, supra note 49, at A22 ("We are all 
for protecting justices, but some loss of privacy goes with the territory, and the justices are hardly 
anonymous. They have been turning up with increasing frequency on television on their own time."). 
There is also no clear proof that the presence of cameras or other increases in Court coverage and 
Justice recognition would actually create a greater security threat, as it is at least arguable that the 
Justices would be safer from random acts of violence if they were widely recognized as members of 
the highest Court in the land. See Jodi Kantor, supra at Al6 (noting that only one of the attacks on a 
Justice in the last fifty years, the attack on White, was connected with his role as a Justice). Even if 
the presence of cameras in oral arguments might necessitate greater security protection for the 
.Justices, that greater protection may already be long overdue. Unless Justices are traveling on 
business as Justices, they have little or no security protection. /d. When Justice Breyer was robbed in 
the Caribbean, the intruders walked right through the front door. !d. 
130. See Landmark Commc'ns, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 838-39 (1978) (quoting 
Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 89 (1941)) ("Although it is assumed that judges will ignore the 
public clamor or media reports and editorials in reaching their decisions and by tradition will not 
respond to public commentary, the law gives '[j)udges as persons, or courts as institutions ... no 
greater immunity from criticism than other persons or institutions."') 
131. See Felix Frankfurter, Personal Amhitions ofJudges: Should a Judge "Think Beyond the 
Judicial"?, 34 A.B.A. J. 656, 658 (1948) ("! am sure you can think of all the subjects that occur to 
my mind as to which, if I could not satisfY you, I might at least interest you. But here I am, suffering 
from what might be called judicial lockjaw."); Hugo L. Black, Assoc. J of the United States Supreme 
Court, Address at the Missouri Bar Annual Banquet (Sept. 25, 1942) (transcript available at 
http://oldsite.mobar.org/e2781 f08-6a9d-4e87-b33f-c 18d20dD250.aspx) ("The very fact that the 
entire range of human problems may come before a Justice in his official capacity imposes a sharp 
limitation on his freedom of discussion in his unofficial capacity."). Justice Scalia has been known to 
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Perhaps, as discussed above, they think they are different from other 
public officials because their neutrality is so critical to what they do. 
Perhaps they also believe that a small, sophisticated legal audience will 
be better able to recognize that interesting commentary in a speech is not 
necessarily a prospective announcement setting forth how a Justice will 
decide a matter that comes before the Court, while a wider media-fed 
audience will necessarily be less savvy, more judgmental, less carefully 
informed, or more likely to find an appearance of impropriety. 
Again, if the preference to exclude the media reflects a desire not to 
be caught speaking inappropriately about cases that might come before 
them, it is manifestly an illegitimate argument. But to the extent that it 
reflects a conviction that the press will inevitably misunderstand, 
mislead, or misinform, 132 it is perhaps the very best example of the real 
depth of the divide between the Supreme Court Justices' jurisprudential 
depiction of the media and their real-world depictions of it. There is no 
clear reason why the very same press that is portrayed as almost 
heroically trustworthy in judicial opinions should be portrayed as 
exceptionally untrustworthy when access to the Court and the Justices 
are at stake. 
V. CONCLUSION 
All told, there is undoubtedly some schizophrenia in the United State 
Supreme Court's on- and off-the-bench attitudes about the media and the 
necessity of press access. To date, discussions of the Court's limited 
policies on media coverage have failed to carefully consider the nuanced 
combinations of explanations for this disconnect-or to parse the 
constitutional, structural, and psychological elements of these divides. 
This Article begins the dialogue on the question by exploring both (1) the 
inconsistencies between the Court's case law on the media and its 
treatment of the media under its own policies and (2) the potential 
justifications for this disparity. Because many aspects of the 
constitutional and structural justifications for the dichotomy break down 
under close analysis, and because individual preferences and personal 
distrust of the press are likewise flawed grounds for distinguishing the 
say candid and blunt things in his speeches, see Journalists on the Workings of the Supreme Court , 
supra note 2, but these speeches have led to demands for him to recuse himself from future cases. 
Leslie B. Dubeck, Understanding "Judicial Lockjaw": The Debate over Extrajudicial Activity, 82 
N.Y.U. L. REv. 569, 571 (2007). 
132. Heilprin, supra note 96, at Al9 (quoting Justice Scalia as saying, 'The press is never 
going to report judicial opinions accurately"). 
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Court from other governmental subjects of media coverage, the Justices 
may wish to reconsider aspects of their individual or collective press 
policies that hinder the journalistic endeavor. 
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